The preface of Edward Luttwak’s classic work on how to overthrow a government reads as follows:
AS THE EVENTS in France of May 1968 have shown yet again, insurrection, the classic vehicle of revolution, is obsolete. The security apparatus of the modern state, with its professional personnel, with its diversified means of transport and communications, and with its extensive sources of information, cannot be defeated by civilian agitation, however intense and prolonged. Any attempt on the part of civilians to use direct violence with improvised means will always be neutralized by the efficiency of modern automatic weapons; a general strike, on the other hand, can temporarily swamp the system, but cannot permanently damage it, since in a modern economic setting, the civilians will run out of food and fuel well before the military, the police and allied organizations.
The modern state is therefore practically invulnerable to a direct assault. Two alternatives remain: guerrilla warfare and the coup d’état… [all emphasis mine]
Luttwak wrote this in 1968. Since then, states around the world have been failing, there have been more and more guerrilla wars, and – contrary to his statements above – many successful insurrections and revolutions. There has also been a decline in both the number of attempted coups d’état and the proportion of successful ones. Why?
- Luttwak proposed that advantages in transport, communications and information made the state practically invulnerable. Technological progress has reduced state power in relative (not absolute) terms, by massively improving civilian communications through the spread of cellphones and internet access.
- “Modern automatic weapons” have become ever cheaper and more available in most parts of the world.
- It’s simply not acceptable, to most people, to fire weapons into a crowd. We have come a long way since the Amritsar massacre of 1919, and even Kent State (1970) and Bloody Sunday (1972). Thus modern automatic weapons cannot be a decisive factor against a civilian uprising.
So at least three of Luttwak’s assumptions no longer hold. Insurrections and revolution are more likely, and for these reasons also, guerrilla warfare is easier and more effective.
But they cannot be the only reasons for the decline of the coup. There were about three times as many coups in the seven years prior to Luttwak’s book as in the last seven years, and the number of failed coups suggests that they have become less likely to succeed. And most recent coups (apart from the military “guardian” coups of Fiji and Thailand) have taken place in Africa, rather than the Middle East, Latin America and even Europe before 1968. (I don’t agree with Coming Anarchy here, I don’t think two or three successful coups represent a “comeback”).
Leaving aside some undeniably relevant historical factors affecting the prevalence of coups – the end of Cold War support of authoritarian rulers, and the spread of democracy, for example – what internal factors affect the success of a coup d’état? Luttwak lists three preconditions for a successful coup:
- Economic backwardness, i.e. disconnectedness. There is an exception for times of political crisis and disunity, but in general a coup is only possible when politics are controlled by a small elite, and most of the population are just trying to survive.
- Political independence. Politics must not be controlled by foreign troops, multinational corporations, or an international organization – unless they are backing the coup plotters.
- Organic unity, not decentralization, federalism or ethnic fragmentation. The country must have a single capital which can be captured, not multiple regional centers , and it must be controlled politically, not by a variety of different groups. Tribes, militias, corporations, mercenaries and so on are all potential obstacles.
All these preconditions are affected by globalization. Increased economic connectedness means that more people have the time and ability to get involved in politics, and there has been massive economic growth, bringing with it demands for political freedom, through most of the world since 1968. Political independence is diluted by economic interdependence. And decentralization and fragmentation has accompanied this process, reducing the importance of national capitals.
It is not surprising then that the coup is no longer the preferred method of changing a government in most parts of the world. It also reinforces the danger of economic isolation and the capture of politics by any small, unaccountable elite. Globalization has reduced state power, and increased the relative power of citizens. Little wonder then that successful coup plotters tend to clamp down on the internet (eg blogs in Fiji, Youtube in Thailand) and the movement of people across borders, the most visible signs of globalization. The decline of the coup d’état parallels the decline of the state, and anyone wishing to overthrow their government should take note.


It seems that large, authoritarian governments are the most suited to be overthrown (run by an elite, heavily centralised bureaucracy and an autocratic parliament).
Handy that!
To my uninformed mind, guerrilla war seems to end in a stalemate more than anything else. Without a decisive blow and a noticeable change of power, it seems to go on in a constant struggle (e.g. Iraq).
Cheers Phil.
Left by Craig D on June 3rd, 2007