Great discussion and I’ve linked New Yorker in DC, thanks.

Thanks for the link, I’ll certainly reciprocate.

As for your qualifications, I agree. Certainly a security pact in east asia isn’t an overnight concept. As for Taiwan one hopes as China continues to modernize (assuming it can hold itself together domestically) it will, to be short, live and let live.

The strategy in this case with regard to China is not a touchy feely approach, it is containment. However, you contain China’s more aggressive tendencies by giving them a stake in the system as it exists and then institutionalizing their place as a pillar of security in Asia.

This does not mean that I believe China to be benign or good, but rather that I recognize its power and capability to destabilize the current world system and crafting a strategy that promotes its more favorable tendencies while reducing the incentive for it to work against the system. The strategies we are discussing are similar in this, except that Barnett’s would take a “show them the carrot” approach, while Kaplan’s would use the “show them the stick.” Ultimately, we have to balance one against the other depending on China’s responses.

On further reflection I think that you (and Phil and nykrindc) are probably right. The inclusion approach may be the most pragmatic approach in the circumstances. Two qualifications though. It depends on timing -if in future China becomes increasingly aggressive, then recourse to tougher measures may be appropriate.

And there is a question about whether the Chinese regime has the right mindset (at present) for joining a regional security arrangement. Such arrangements, particularly ‘tight’ ones like NATO, require participants to abide by rules and norms of behaviour. Picking up on Phil’s earlier observation, to use but one example, China’s behaviour over Taiwan is not, to my way of thinking, compatible with a cooperative security arrangement.

But thinking about it – if you try touchy feely with a rising power (and China demonstrates at least some of the hallmarks of an aggressively rising power), then this will be taken by the Chinese regime as a sign of weakness and a spur to further aggressive behaviour.

Containing China through a network of regional alliances signals resolve and sends a message that it is better for China to work within a system of rules. It is not automatically tantamount to a declaration of war.

Some interesting links on Mountain Runner about Chinese and African perceptions of involvement in Africa.

The suggestions about new security regimes are interesting and I agree more with Barnett than Kaplan. That said China’s insistence on internal sovereignty as the paramount norm, and the inaction of ASEAN wrt Burma, makes me sceptical about the effectiveness of IGOs involving China.

I’m also worried about China’s vulnerability to internal violence. The potential violent collapse of China is far scarier than the “peaceful rise”.

In fact, they are. They are also using their presence to promote business deals, using aid in return for business contracts.

This however, is a welcome development. After all, it brings further connectivity into a very disconnected continent (positive connectivity) which in turn kick starts local economies. What we need to work on with China is, using that connectivity to establish rule-sets that promote democracy and human rights. In the long run, even China knows that they need a stable Africa, if they are to grow economically and benefit from increased trade.

Kaplans assessment seems a bit myopic, his genius aside. China is no Iran.