Barnett argues for bringing China into the fold by creating a new security apparatus a la NATO for East Asia. That would be one sure way to not only signal to China that the strengthening alliances are not meant to encircle it, and also to institutionalize a new security regime in East Asia that ties China into the System as much as the US.

Left by nykrindc on March 17th, 2007

Alternatively, Robert D Kaplan argues that the US should encircle China, through a hub and spoke system of alliances, with USPACOM (in Hawaii) the hub and regional countries the spokes.

I hadn’t realized that the Chinese were becoming so involved in UN peacekeeping missions. It would be interesting to see where their troops are deployed (primarily Africa?) and what sort of troops they are sending. Any information on that Phil? If it was me, I would use these peacekeeping units as good cover for sending out geological exploration parties, seismic teams, and surveyors.

Left by The strategist on March 17th, 2007

I agree, strategist. I’d put my peacekeepers in Africa and continue to solidify my energy means there.

Kaplans assessment seems a bit myopic, his genius aside. China is no Iran.

Left by subadei on March 17th, 2007

If it was me, I would use these peacekeeping units as good cover for sending out geological exploration parties, seismic teams, and surveyors.

In fact, they are. They are also using their presence to promote business deals, using aid in return for business contracts.

This however, is a welcome development. After all, it brings further connectivity into a very disconnected continent (positive connectivity) which in turn kick starts local economies. What we need to work on with China is, using that connectivity to establish rule-sets that promote democracy and human rights. In the long run, even China knows that they need a stable Africa, if they are to grow economically and benefit from increased trade.

Left by nykrindc on March 17th, 2007

12 years ago, when I was rather more idealistic about international relations than now, I would have agreed with Barnett. And when I read Kaplan’s article on containing China my first reaction was that he’d gone nuts.

But thinking about it – if you try touchy feely with a rising power (and China demonstrates at least some of the hallmarks of an aggressively rising power), then this will be taken by the Chinese regime as a sign of weakness and a spur to further aggressive behaviour.

Containing China through a network of regional alliances signals resolve and sends a message that it is better for China to work within a system of rules. It is not automatically tantamount to a declaration of war.

Left by The strategist on March 17th, 2007

Strat, I agree that such a strategy isn’t tantamount to declaring war. However, and perhaps I’m a global idealist , it seems more beneficial (not only in light of Barnett’s theory) to include China in such a regional alliance. Such an economic force that is China would seem to be better utilized through inclusion rather than marginalization. I would ask: What would invite Chinese aggression more: a touchy feely (as you put it, lol) approach of inclusion or an alienating approach of building an international strategic framework that essentially excludes and surrounds China? Perhaps you could explore this in detail with a blog post? I liked your bit on Scipio and the 2nd Punic war btw.

Left by subadei on March 18th, 2007

Thanks subadei for your comment on the Punic War post. BTW I’ve linked my blog to yours and nykrindc’s.

On further reflection I think that you (and Phil and nykrindc) are probably right. The inclusion approach may be the most pragmatic approach in the circumstances. Two qualifications though. It depends on timing -if in future China becomes increasingly aggressive, then recourse to tougher measures may be appropriate.

And there is a question about whether the Chinese regime has the right mindset (at present) for joining a regional security arrangement. Such arrangements, particularly ‘tight’ ones like NATO, require participants to abide by rules and norms of behaviour. Picking up on Phil’s earlier observation, to use but one example, China’s behaviour over Taiwan is not, to my way of thinking, compatible with a cooperative security arrangement.

Left by The strategist on March 18th, 2007

Strat,

The strategy in this case with regard to China is not a touchy feely approach, it is containment. However, you contain China’s more aggressive tendencies by giving them a stake in the system as it exists and then institutionalizing their place as a pillar of security in Asia.

This does not mean that I believe China to be benign or good, but rather that I recognize its power and capability to destabilize the current world system and crafting a strategy that promotes its more favorable tendencies while reducing the incentive for it to work against the system. The strategies we are discussing are similar in this, except that Barnett’s would take a “show them the carrot” approach, while Kaplan’s would use the “show them the stick.” Ultimately, we have to balance one against the other depending on China’s responses.

Left by nykrindc on March 18th, 2007

strat,

Thanks for the link, I’ll certainly reciprocate.

As for your qualifications, I agree. Certainly a security pact in east asia isn’t an overnight concept. As for Taiwan one hopes as China continues to modernize (assuming it can hold itself together domestically) it will, to be short, live and let live.

Left by subadei on March 18th, 2007

Thanks Phil. I’ve also linked PE on my page.

Left by nykrindc on March 18th, 2007