Fijians in Mosul, 2004Some recent events, ending in court cases, have thrown light on the little-known topic of mercenaries in the Pacific region, and on the implications of the proliferation of private military companies (PMCs) in general:

  • In Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, four remaining Fijian ex-soldiers supplied by the aptly named Fijian PMC Ronin surrendered to the authorities. They had been training a private army for pyramid-scheme conman and self-proclaimed “King of Papala”, Noah Musingku, until a deadly raid by a rival armed group, the Bougainville Freedom Fighters, late last year. One Fijian mercenary remains on the run. Musingku promised them F$1 million each which he could never have paid – and he certainly couldn’t afford the F$35 million he reportedly offered to Fiji’s army chief Voreqe Bainimarama before the coup. More info and analysis in a previous post.
  • In Lebanon, an Australian and a New Zealander, both ex-SAS, are in prison, after they were hired by Lebanese-Canadian Melissa Hawach to help her regain custody of her children – allegedly by kidnapping them.

Context

A major PMC, DynCorp, has just received a $10 million contract to provide services to African peacekeepers in Somalia. It could be a new model of peacekeeping – the US provides cash, private companies supply the logistics, and poor countries the boots on the ground. Many analysts and bloggers prefer to concentrate on the positive potential of PMCs – their deployments could be more efficient, politically palatable, and militarily more effective than using a traditional army. But there is another side, suggested by the above stories.

Mercenaires won’t only be hired by respectable state militaries or international organizations, nor will their use be restricted to peacekeeping or humanitarian operations, as the PR suggests. Individual mercenaries will be hired by rich and powerful individuals and small groups, often on the wrong side of the law, and especially in countries where the law means little. Whether that’s a shady warlord or a caring mother is beside the point – the proliferation of PMCs levels the playing field. It changes the balance of power, and not in favour of the state.

Dangers

That has potentially bad implications for global security, and particularly in the Pacific with all the Fijian contractors in Iraq (and places like Bougainville). Here is an excellent Vanity Fair piece on mercenary mogul Tim Spicer. It’s a fascinating and often unpleasant story. It’s relevant to the Bougainville case because Spicer – now working in Iraq – was in charge of the mercenary group hired by the PNG government to suppress the Bougainville rebellion. Predictably, their plan owed nothing to counter-insurgency thinking and would have relied entirely on airborne bombing and raids against villages – it could have been a bloodbath, had the PNG military, offended at the multi-million dollar contract, not mutinied and sent the mercenaries straight home. The high pay of mercenaries invites resentment from regular soldiers and locals alike, and their tactics usually, well, lack subtlety.

The dangerous trend, though, is withdrawal from Iraq. Mercenaries make up the second largest foreign force in Iraq, and they will be going home along with US and British forces sometime in the near future. What happens then for many of the contractors, especially from poorer countries like Fiji? Prices will drop, and some of those mercenaries will want to create their own work, and start their own groups. What then for the Fijians, and what will the effect be on the various flashpoints around the Pacific and the world when that happens?

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9 Responses to “Mercenaries of the Pacific”

Interesting post Phil. Another potential danger about using private military companies is that they may have an interest in prolonging conflict (to maintain a revenue stream) rather than ending it. A historical parallel is Renaissance Italy, with the proliferation of condotierii (mercenary generals/entrepreneurs contracting to princes, popes and republics) who tended to fight ritualized battles with an emphasis on avoiding loss of life and hardship.

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Interesting question for you:

If an elected government is being threatend by an insurgency (rebels) and the governments military is not strong enough to stand on its own against these rebels isn’t that elected government within its rights to use “mercenaries” to help defend itself and its people?

This has been the case in a number of African countries in the past.

I do however agree there are potential problems, and in some cases the private security company can become more powerful than the government itself.

One such instance occurred in Africa. The government hired a provate military company and could not afford to pay in cash. The government paid the company with rights to the countries natural resources.

Now that is a scary thought!

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Peter: Agreed.  This is not unique to mercenaries though.  Governments might prolong conflict for internal unity, to allow the suppression of dissent, etc.  Armed forces, to maintain their funding, criminal groups and rebel groups, because of lucrative revenue opportunities and the basic desire to fight.  Not to mention the arms dealers.
Eric:  Well yes, of course. But there are two issues with that:

  • The government is not within its rights to allow the slaughter of its own citizens. Collateral damage, sure, but apparently the Executive Outcomes campaign in Sierra Leone, while effective, did involve mass civilian casualties. Counter-insurgency should be more subtle and based on regaining popular support. Employing PMCs in a front-line role might prove counterproductive.
  • It is prudent to keep the support of your own military, which was the mistake of PNG’s leaders. They risked a military coup because the underfunded army resented the $36 million fee that Sandline charged.

I think that payment with resources was common for EO/Sandline in the 1990s, and probably would have occurred in Bougainville if not for the mutiny. Employing PMCs has definite advantages, but it can risk the loss of popular legitimacy, especially for an already-weak state.

Another danger is state armed forces effectively becoming mercenaries, when they rely for funding on multinational resource companies who pay for security services (West Papua, Nigeria etc).

What I find more worrying, though, is that any individual or group who can afford the fee could hire mercenaries, including rebels, terrorists, criminals, warlords and so on. Not all mercenaries would work for such groups – especially not the large corporations employed by the US – but contractors from poor countries would find it tempting, especially after the demand for their services declines in Iraq.

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Surely a private defence militia also has competing interests against a prolonged battle. Their future welfare, and chance of being hired, will reduce if they don’t act with haste and prolong battles, etc.

The argument that returning mercenaries may create conflict to maximise income doesn’t, economically, make much sense – they should have been doing that before, anyway, if the argument was correct.

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Phil – re. your comment “that any individual or group who can afford the fee could hire etc…” – there’s nothing new or unusual in this. The situation you describe typically occurs in the aftermath of prolonged conflict and mobilization. The earliest example I can think of occurred at the end of the Peloponnesian War when Greek hoplites went east to fight in the dynastic struggles of the Persian empire. What interests me is a situation within western countries in which wealthy individuals or communities hire private military companies to safeguard them from high crime, societal breakdown, refugee inflows and so on. The US, with its extremes of wealth and poverty, could increasingly go this way.

Peter

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Steve: Not sure what you mean by a “private defense militia”. I think anyone who benefits from war, or the lack of security, has an incentive to maintain, if not escalate, that level of conflict. An example is the security companies who guard oil infrastructure in Nigeria. In some cases they make the situation worse by alienating the local population, some of whom join guerrilla movements. The security companies have an incentive to reduce and to fight off attacks, but they don’t have any incentive to help solve the conflict. If the conflict ended, they would be out of work.

And it isn’t so much that returning mercenaries may create conflict to maximise income, as you put it. Unemployed soldiers of any kind tend to cause conflict, especially if they don’t have skills needed in peacetime.

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Phil,

I would not necassarily agree that “Unemployed soldiers of any kind tend to cause conflict, especially if they don’t have skills needed in peacetime.”

I know a number of ex-SAS that do contract work, return home and they are just like any of us. They are not running around looking for more work, but if a job arises and thier skills suit they may take on the offer.

Like any military or armed resistance, they are there to defend or protect, not solve the issues surrounding a conflict.

That is what politicians get paid for. : )

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Of course they may benefit from prolonging conflict. However, there’s also the reverse incentive – ending conflicts suggest they’re more likely to be hired by others, and perhaps paid more. There’s no shortage of conflicts to hire succesful groups that end them.

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[...] In an increasingly interconnected world with high commodity prices, and as high-powered weapons continue to proliferate in Oceania, we will undoubtedly see more wars over resources in the region. Transnational crime, mercenaries, PMCs and militant cults could all gain money and power from a new resource war – the losers would be the ordinary people and local landowners of Melanesia, and the impoverished states which depend on resource exports to pay the bills. These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages. [...]

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