We are nearing the end of the age of nation-states. One of the chief signifiers of this change is the decline of nationalism, as people find new sources of loyalty and, as states transform, they look for new sources of legitimacy. It’s interesting to look at events in Europe through that lens. (see this previous post for thoughts on European nationalism, immigration and ethnic conflict)

Scotland

Scotland, land of my forefathers, has been part of the United Kingdom for 300 years, and has shared the same monarch with England for over 400 years. With separatist sentiment rising, Gordon Brown has warned of some kind of unprecendented threat to British unity.

Such a threat is exaggerated. Support for full independence is not yet dominant, and there’s no reason to complain about increased autonomy, which could reduce the strain on overly-centralised British institutions. But as the UK gives more power to Brussels and Edinburgh, it becomes less and less like a nation-state, and less able to call on nationalism to support its legitimacy. Until that problem is solved it will be more difficult to maintain internal order and while fighting in foreign wars.

Northern Ireland

The recent scandal about police support for paramilitary murderers calls the role of the state into question, as well. Sinn Fein has finally expressed support for the police as a result, with the hope of making the force less partisan. This is good news, but you can also see it in terms of the reduced importance of nationalism causing priorities to change (ie, law and order has become more important to Sinn Fein than national independence).

The Balkans

The EU seems to inadvertently encourage fragmentation, by reducing the importance of national capitals. The desire to join the EU is positive in terms of peace in the former Yugoslavia. It also spells the final end of Yugoslavia as either a nation or a state. With Montenegro’s independence, two anomalies remain – Republika Srpska, the autonomous Serbian part of Bosnia, and UN-occupied, Albanian-majority Kosovo. Republika Srpska wants to emulate Montenegro and become fully independent. Bosnia is partly governed by the EU and the international community, who oppose the split. Interestingly, Republika Srpska’s leaders have not promoted unity with Serbia itself.

Likewise, Kosovars have drifted away from Albania, as the Economist has reported, and Albania is also uninterested in a “Greater Albania” expansion. Albanian nationalism has declined, and Kosovar nationalism, with less than a century of separate history, has replaced it.

Spain

The ETA airport bombing, and the capture of a guerrilla scoping out the America’s Cup regatta in Valencia, are a cause for concern. But overall Basque nationalism has declined, and while enough of a militant edge remains to plan bombings – the number of people needed to plan and carry out attacks has also declined – most Basques are content with increased autonomy. Other areas of Spain are following suit: Catalonia last year, Andalusia this month.

Youth riots directed against Latin American gangs occurred recently. Here we see how immigration and black globalization – the spread of imported crime networks – can cause tensions. The rioters were pilloried for alleged racism, but denied it angrily. Riots, terrorism, ethnic tension and organised crime – along with separatism and the EU, Spain shows all the symptoms of the decline of the state.

Russia

A particularly tragic case as ethnic Russians are decling at up to 750,000 a year. There are more abortions than births, and unbelievable rates of alcohol poisoning and suicide. Russia’s infrastructure, inadequate since Soviet times, is crumbling, threatening the economy and causing tens of thousands of “technogenic” accident deaths. Diseases and crime claim many lives. This has economic, social and military implications: conscription is necessary to maintain the army and secure the borders, but the available population will fall and brutal treatment by older soldiers makes conscription understandably unpopular. Immigrants fill gaps in the economy, particularly in street markets and the oil industry.

So according to the Economist, in a nationalistic backlash, immigrants have been barred from street markets. This follows a homemade bomb made by teenage neo-nazis which killed 11 immigrants in a Moscow market. The move is unlikely to change much. Russia is the destination for most migrants from ex-Soviet Central Asia, many of them Muslim. And in Siberia and the Far East, Chinese workers and entrepeneurs see opportunity. Numbers are proportionately small, but plummeting Russian population combined with a high immigrant birth rate could change that quickly. If tensions reach breaking point, Russia could get very messy.

Conclusion

Today’s nation-states must find a way to increase their legitimacy, or to transform themselves to new conditions. This will be painful for the more conservative and bureaucratic states of Europe, but states in the former Soviet Union seem to be adapting more quickly (the Baltic states are particularly impressive). The EU has had some success, but lacks popular legitimacy because its Parliament is unaccountable and toothless. It seems likely that sovereignty will continue to be redistributed upwards and downwards, and that one of the main issues will be maintaining peace between communities no longer united by the idea of nationality.

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6 Responses to “Europe: the decline of nationalism”

I think the steady decline of nationalism will ultimately lead to a more libertarian world – certainly a more efficient one. Patri Friedman (grandson of) wrote an interesting article and book on this, and how to speed it up (his particular plan was floating islands called ‘Seasteads’. Short blurb on the idea called ‘Dynamic Geography.’

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Here’s the link.

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Excellent post. I think the issue in Europe is that the EU makes small states not only feasible, but also very attractive. Because of that, nationalism is both augmented and weakened. While coming together with the rest of Europe, people want to have their own state at the same time.

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Rebuttal:

UK: The replacement of British identity with English/Scottish/etc. identity does not represent the decline of nationalism, just the replacement of one with another.

Balkans: There has never been a strong Yugoslavian nationalism. Again, this is just the replacement of nationalisms.

Spain: Spain has always had internal problems. The fact that they don’t deal with their problems with the same repression as they did under Franco doesn’t mean states are declining, just that they’re less reliant on coercion.

Russia: … OK Russia’s screwed up, I got no answer.

Interesting post though.

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Thanks for the comments!

Steve: The link is indeed interesting. Dynamic geography sounds like an extension of competitive federalism, which I think is a great advantage of federal states like the US and India, not that it works perfectly, especially when the Feds take more power than they need. And the deterritorialization of identity (sorry about the jargon, I mean that people increasingly aren’t tied to the land) will have many positive effects, even while causing a lot of tension. Like the exaggerated fear in the Western EU about migrant workers from the East taking “their” jobs.

The decline of the state, on the other hand, has quite a few negative effects for liberty, especially if you think global connectivity is a force for good. The main thing I don’t like about the perennial libertarian artificial-island schemes is the isolation – why cut yourself off from all the good things in the world? And what’s the economic rationale for moving to an offshore platform in the middle of nowhere? You have to make money to sustain such a project. If anyone would benefit from an isolated seastead type platform, its more likely to be organized criminals than libertarians.

Chirol: Thanks (and thanks for your comment on my ZenPundit post, too!). The EU is not sustained by any European nationalism, and a pan-European political elite hasn’t really materialised either. But it is an attractive platform and more like a market-state than a nation-state. The autonomous regions and small states seeking independence are in my opinion formed more out of a practical desire for control of local affairs, rather than nationalism.

a517dogg: Interesting comment (and a good blog).

You say that Spain is “less reliant on coercion”. But also, coercion is less effective. The decline of the state is caused by the increased power of individuals and small groups. Because these groups have more money, more weapons, and better communications (even compared to Franco’s time) government repression of them is much more difficult, too. The relative decline in power of the central state is part of what causes the decline in nationalism, and increase in decentralisation.

Yeah, Russia’s screwed.

I don’t agree that the Balkans and the UK are examples of nationalisms replacing each other. Nationalism is clearly far weaker than it used to be (think of the great European revolutions of 1848, and the bloody unification of Germany and Italy as examples). There is very little nationalism in the UK of any kind, IMO. I think the motivation for Scottish separatism is something distinct from nationalism, especially since the desire isn’t for a traditional nation-state, but greater autonomy within both the UK and the EU.

As for the Balkans, ethno-nationalism has been far stronger than Yugoslav nationalism. But even that has weakened since the 1990s. The most interesting point there, for me, was that the Kosovar Albanians, with less than a century of shared history, desire independence rather than unification with Albania, and Albania itself isn’t concerned either. That’s not normal for nationalists or nation-states.

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One more thing: Steve, if you haven’t read The Rise and Decline of the State by Martin van Creveld, you should do so.

Here’s a review from an anarcho-capitalist at Mises.org, and a summarised version given as a lecture to the Mises Institute.

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Something to say?