The final case study in the resource war series, involving oil, drugs, mercenaries, corporations, transnational crime, insurgency and terrorism. See Part 1 for the introduction, and the other case studies are Part 2: Bougainville, Part 3: Sierra Leone, and Part 4: The Niger Delta. I will post the conclusion soon.
Background, and the effects of cocaine
My final example is Colombia, an ongoing war involving two main left-wing revolutionary movements, drug cartels and associated mercenaries, the Colombian government, oil corporations, and right-wing paramilitaries. Almost all groups control coca-growing areas in the jungle. Cocaine is lootable, illegal and unobstructable, and it conforms to Ross’ expectations by lengthening the conflict, enriching rebels and peasants, and affecting discipline on all sides.
Oil – an obstructable resource
Ross also cited left-wing ELN as an example of a group “taxing†oil, an easily obstructable resource: “In 2000, for example, the pipelines were bombed 98 times. Colombia’s rebel groups have used these attacks to extort an estimated $140 million annually.”
Grievance vs. greed, and state failure
But oil and cocaine didn’t start the conflict. The cocaine production is a consequence of the loss of state power due to insurgency, resulting in a power vacuum, and the attacks on oil are purely opportunistic. The war began as a relatively low-intensity political struggle, and it only went beyond a “nuisance†level when global crime networks moved in, bringing with them massive quantities of cash and arms, and encouraging corruption, thereby reducing the government’s legitimacy.
Drugs – the failure of targeted sanctions?
The situation is an extreme example of the potential unintended consequences of targeted sanctions – banning cocaine lowered supply, but had a smaller effect on demand, so prices rose. It would be a radical solution, but legalising hard drugs would immediately drive down prices, reducing the funds available for armed groups in weak states like Afghanistan, Burma and Colombia.
References
- Michael L. Ross. “Oil, Drugs and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War,†in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, ed., Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003.
- Guaqueta, Alexandra. “The Colombian Conflict: Political and Economic Dimensions” in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, ed., Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, Boulder: Lynee Rienner, 2003.
