This post is part of the Resource War series. Other posts include Part 1: Introduction.

Greed or grievance?

The Bougainville conflict superficially falls into the “resource war” paradigm of Collier and Ross. Islanders rebelled against the central government and the mining company Bougainville Copper Ltd., apparently intending to secede, and then keep the resource wealth. In reality, the conflict challenges almost all of Collier’s assumptions; notably, the leaders and participants in the rebellion put themselves in great personal danger for no economic return. The first act of the rebellion was to shut down the electricity supply of the mine permanently, making no attempt to blackmail. Bougainville is unquestionably economically worse off than it would be if they had not rebelled, given the level of investment it provided and the hardship inflicted by the Papuan government. The islanders were poorly armed and severely outnumbered. Rebel leader Sam Kauona recalled: “Quite frankly they had no assault weapons and were not prepared for any major offensive from the PNG military. However, they all had determination and confidence in the cause they had undertaken.” Resources cannot buy that sort of loyalty, as Machiavelli recognised five centuries ago when he advised against the use of mercenaries.

The Sandline affair

Surprisingly, the islanders successfully fought back with their improvised weaponry, provoking a naval blockade. During this enforced famine up to ten thousand islanders died of hunger or disease – a common strategy in new wars, according to Mary Kaldor. Prime Minister Julius Chan failed to negotiate peace and decided that only a military solution would be politically beneficial. After two failed offensives, one involving an embarrassing massacre of drunken soldiers , Chan decided to seek outside support. Private military corporation Sandline prepared a report for Chan on possible options, containing startlingly superficial analysis of the problems facing Chan’s government – a “calculated… sales effort,” according to Anthony Regan, blaming the Australian government and media for the failure of the PNG Defence Forces to defeat the rebel BRA. It is not confirmed, but Sandline may have asked for a share in the Panguna copper mine as part of the payment for their attack: their subcontractor Executive Outcomes acquired mineral resources throughout Africa in return for military support to failing states. Sandline’s “Operation Contravene” could have caused massive civilian casualties, Bougainvillean writer Ruth Saovana-Spriggs suspected. She quoted a report from a Sandline operation in Sierra Leone: “…it was reported that pilots working with the mercenaries were having difficulty distinguishing between rebels and civilians… they were reportedly told to ‘kill everybody.’” Fortunately, Brigadier-General Jerry Singirok would not allow the plan. Capturing the mercenaries when they arrived, he warned of the dangers of civilian casualties: the public would “no longer trust the government of the day and the Defence Forces which has the obligation of protecting them.” Singirok proposed a return to peace talks and an attempt to win hearts and minds, admitting that the islanders had legitimate grievances. Singirok’s action forced the Prime Minister to step down and created an opportunity for moderates on both sides to resolve the conflict.

Conclusions

This example challenges Michael Ross’ conclusions. Copper is not a lootable resource, and yet the war was prolonged. Although the resource proved to be easily obstructable, the islanders did not attempt to extort the mining company. And while the conflict was party motivated by separatism, the islanders did not want to reopen the mine once they gained control of the island. Ross would have predicted a short war, but due to the weakness of the state it lasted for nearly a decade. It is also worth noting that the profit-motivated parties in this conflict came off worst, while the grievance-motivated islanders actually achieved their original objective.

Links

• Interview with rebel leader Sam Kauona, NZine.com
• Wikipedia: History of Bougainville
• Wikipedia: The Sandline affair

References

• Collier, Paul. “Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, ed. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000.
• Dinnen, Sinclair. “Trading in security: private military contractors in Papua New Guinea,” in Challenging the State: the Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea, ed., Sinclair Dinnen, Ron May and Anthony J. Regan, Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, 1997.
• Dorney, Sean. The Sandline Affair: Politics and mercenaries and the Bougainville crisis, Sydney: ABC Books, 1998.
• Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.
• NZine.com. “Conflict in Bougainville,” 2000.
• Regan, Anthony J. “Preparation for war and progress towards peace – Bougainville dimensions of the Sandline affair,” in Challenging the State: the Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea, ed., Sinclair Dinnen, Ron May and Anthony J. Regan, Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, 1997.
• Ross, Michael L. “Oil, Drugs and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War,” in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, ed., Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003.
• Saovana-Spriggs, Ruth, “The rise of power is the beginning of its downfall: a Bougainvillean perspective on the Sandline affair,” in Challenging the State: the Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea, ed., Sinclair Dinnen, Ron May and Anthony J. Regan, Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, 1997.
• Singirok, Jerry. “Appendix document 7: Singirok’s address to the nation,” in Challenging the State: the Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea, ed., Sinclair Dinnen, Ron May and Anthony J. Regan, Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, 1997.

Posted by Phil on Thursday, October 5th, 2006 at 10:26 pm.